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DIY SOLUTIONS TO THE  
HOBBY LOBBY PROBLEM 
Kristin Haule∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.1 is one of the most 
controversial Supreme Court decisions in recent times, yet the 
practical problems it creates are also some of the easiest to fix. The 
decision has been criticized for bolstering the rights of corporations 
at the expense of actual people—notably women. But there are many 
public misconceptions about the actual implications of this case. 
Fortunately, the perceived injustices are actually much smaller and 
more easily fixable than is generally understood. 
In Section II, this Note discusses the historical backdrop leading 
up to the Hobby Lobby decision. It explains how the law evolved to 
raise the issue presented in Hobby Lobby. It also illustrates where the 
Hobby Lobby decision fits within the back-and-forth dialogue 
between the Supreme Court and Congress regarding free exercise 
rights. 
Section III of this Note focuses on the current law, explaining 
the HHS contraceptive mandate portion of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) and the Hobby Lobby decision’s impact 
on that mandate. 
In Section IV, this Note critiques the existing law, pointing out 
popular criticisms and potential ramifications of the Hobby Lobby 
decision. 
Section V outlines three potential solutions to the problems 
created by the Hobby Lobby decision, and Section VI elaborates 
upon which of these three solutions is the best. 
∗ J.D., Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, May 2016. Tremendous thanks to Professor
Justin Levitt for his expert guidance and valuable feedback in writing this Note. Many thanks also 
to the members of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their careful and diligent efforts in 
bringing this Note through the publication process. 
1. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Understanding the evolution of free exercise rights in the United 
States is critical to fully understanding the Hobby Lobby decision, its 
context, and its implications. Free exercise rights have not been static 
throughout history. Rather, the current state of the law is the result of 
a back-and-forth dialogue between the Supreme Court, limiting the 
scope of free exercise rights, and Congress, expanding it. In many 
ways, the Hobby Lobby decision is the next statement within that 
back-and-forth dialogue. 
A. Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith 
In 1987, the Oregon legislature passed a law prohibiting the 
possession of controlled substances not prescribed by a medical 
practitioner.2 It included the hallucinogenic drug peyote within the 
definition of “controlled substance.”3 While several other states 
exempted sacramental peyote use from their respective drug laws,4 
Oregon did not.5 
Following this law’s passage, a private drug rehabilitation 
organization in Oregon fired two of its employees, Alfred Smith and 
Galen Black, for ingesting peyote at a Native American Church 
ceremony.6 Both employees were members of the Native American 
Church, a widespread religion among Native Americans.7 The State 
of Oregon subsequently denied the employees’ unemployment 
compensation applications because they had been discharged for 
“work-related misconduct.”8 The employees brought suit, 
challenging the constitutionality of the Oregon statute under the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.9 
Existing case law at the time seemed to support Smith and 
Black.10 Both legal scholars and the general public assumed that the 
2. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 890.
5. Id. at 876.
6. Id. at 874.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 872.
9. Id. at 872–74.
10. Janet V. Rugg & Andria A. Simone, The Free Exercise Clause: Employment Division v.
Smith’s Inexplicable Departure from the Strict Scrutiny Standard, 6 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL 
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government must justify burdening this kind of religious practice by 
demonstrating a compelling governmental interest, especially in 
employment benefit cases such as this.11 Plus, popular opinion 
supported Smith and Black.12 
Nonetheless, in April of 1990, the Supreme Court departed from 
this precedent13 and held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment does not prevent a state from creating a drug law that 
prohibits even sacramental peyote use.14 The Court reasoned that to 
rule otherwise would essentially eviscerate our legal system.15 It 
declined to apply strict scrutiny to such generally applicable laws 
which inadvertently burden religious practice, explaining that to do 
so would “creat[e] a private right to ignore generally applicable 
laws.”16 It further explained that the political process could 
adequately protect these religious rights if that is what society 
wants.17 A rehearing was denied on June 4, 1990.18 
B. RFRA & AIRFA Amendments 1994
The Smith decision was wildly unpopular, among both regular 
citizens and legislatures.19 Congress reacted quickly to the Smith 
decision, taking particular note that “the free exercise of religion may 
be protected through the political process.”20 The very next month, 
on July 26, 1990, lawmakers introduced the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA) into the House.21 RFRA states that the 
government may not substantially burden a person’s exercise of 
religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general 
COMMENT. 117, 126 n.40 (1990) (describing the two-part strict scrutiny test adopted in Sherbert 
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and followed by several cases thereafter).
11. Id. at 126–28.
12. Id. at 119.
13. Id. at 127.
14. Smith, 494 U.S. at 872.
15. Id. at 885 (explaining that “[t]o make an individual’s obligation to obey such a law
contingent upon the law’s coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State’s interest 
is ‘compelling,’ permit[s] him, ‘to become a law unto himself’”). 
16. Id. at 886.
17. Id. at 890 (“Values that are protected against government interference through
enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the political process.”). 
18. Id. at 872.
19. BRUCE LEDEWITZ, AMERICAN RELIGIOUS DEMOCRACY: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE 
END OF SECULAR POLITICS 37 (2007). 
20. H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 4 (1993).
21. H.R. 5377, 101st Cong. (1990).
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applicability, unless the law passes strict scrutiny.22 This originally 
applied to both federal and state laws.23 Congress cited the 
enforcement power of the Fourteenth Amendment as its 
constitutional authority for passing RFRA.24 In 1993, RFRA became 
law.25 
The following year, Congress relied on its power to regulate 
commerce with Indian tribes to pass the American Indian Religious 
Freedom Act Amendments of 1994.26 Included among the 
amendments was a law protecting traditional Indian religious use of 
peyote.27 The law itself included a statement that lawmakers passed 
these amendments in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Smith.28 
C. City of Boerne v. Flores
City of Boerne v. Flores29 then challenged RFRA’s 
constitutionality. The City of Boerne, Texas, enacted Ordinance 
91-05 to protect historic landmarks.30 The Saint Peter Catholic
Church in Boerne sought a building permit to enlarge the church
building to accommodate its growing parish, but the permit was
denied under the Ordinance.31 The Archbishop of the church, P.F.
Flores, brought suit, challenging the ordinance as invalid under
RFRA.32 The Supreme Court ultimately sided with the city and
invalidated RFRA as applicable to the States.33 It explained, “RFRA
is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object
that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent,
unconstitutional behavior” under the Fourteenth Amendment.34
The Flores Court echoed and elaborated upon many of the 
concerns brought up in Smith. It explained that RFRA substantially 
22. Id.
23. H.R. 1308, 103d Cong. § 5 (1993).
24. S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 13–14 (1993).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000b-1 (1994).
26. American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-344,
1325 (1994). 
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (1994).
28. § 1996a(a)(4)–(5).
29. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
30. Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1354 (1996).
31. Flores, 521 U.S. at 512.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 532.
34. Id.
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curtails the States’ traditional general regulatory power.35 RFRA’s 
scope far exceeds the purported goal of preventing and remedying 
constitutional violations for two reasons.36 First, RFRA was not 
limited to laws that have been motivated by religious bigotry.37 
Second, numerous state laws substantially burden individuals.38 
Furthermore, RFRA’s stated goal was to essentially overrule the 
Smith decision by adopting the strict scrutiny standard for laws of 
general applicability that incidentally burden religious practice.39 
Therefore, RFRA, as applied to the States, ventures impermissibly 
into the judicial branch of government.40 
But Congress does not need to rely on the Fourteenth 
Amendment in order to carve out a religious practices exemption for 
federal laws.41 This is presumably proper under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, as necessary and proper to carrying out the 
implementation of each of the existing laws to which Congress 
wishes to carve out an exception.42 Furthermore, the Flores concerns 
about violating the separation of powers arose in the context of 
Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement clause powers.43 
Therefore, the separation of powers concerns do not apply to 
Congress’s power to apply RFRA to the federal government.44 
Consequently, while Flores invalidated RFRA as applied to state 
laws, RFRA remains in effect as applied to federal laws, at least to 
35. Id. at 534.
36. Id. at 535.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 536 (“RFRA was designed to control cases and controversies, such as the one
before us; but as the provisions of the federal statute here invoked are beyond congressional 
authority, it is this Court’s precedent, not RFRA, which must control.”). 
40. Id.
41. Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 958 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[B]ecause Congress’ ability
to make laws applicable to the federal government in no way depends on its enforcement power 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Flores decision does not determine the 
constitutionality of RFRA as applied to the federal government.”). 
42. Id. at 959 (“[F]inally, the Committee believes that Congress has the constitutional
authority to enact [RFRA]. Pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Necessary and Proper Clause embodied in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, the legislative 
branch has been given the authority to provide statutory protection for a constitutional 
value . . . .”) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 17 (1993)). 
43. Id.
44. Id.
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the extent that Congress does not create future laws which modify or 
repeal it.45 
D. RLUIPA
In 2000, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), which amended RFRA by 
expanding the term “religious exercise” to include “any exercise of 
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of 
religious belief.”46 RLUIPA clarified the intended sweeping breadth 
of RFRA: “the exercise of religion ‘shall be construed in favor of a 
broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent 
permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution.’”47 
In 2006, the Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit’s 
interpretation that RFRA is still valid law as applied to the federal 
government in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do 
Vegetal.48 In that case, a religious group brought suit, challenging the 
federal Controlled Substances Act’s proscription of the group’s use 
of hoasca—a Schedule I hallucinogenic tea used as part of the 
group’s religious services.49 The Court determined that under RFRA, 
the federal government must still justify enforcement of its laws that 
burden religious institutions by demonstrating a compelling 
interest.50 
In support of its decision requiring strict scrutiny, the Court first 
pointed out that the president and Congress have already exempted 
Native American religious use of peyote, another Schedule I 
substance, from the Controlled Substances Act.51 It rejected the 
government’s argument that, notwithstanding RFRA’s longstanding 
protection of sacramental peyote use, the Court should nonetheless 
45. Id.
46. Enacted as 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5 (2000), incorporated to apply to all of RFRA under 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb-2. 
47. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2772 (2014) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc-3(g)).
48. 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
49. Id. at 423–24.
50. Id. at 430–31 (“RFRA requires the Government to demonstrate that the compelling
interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law ‘to the person’—the particular 
claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.”). 
51. Id. at 421.
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carve out an exception to RFRA to ban even religious use of 
hoasca.52 The Court explained:  
While there may be instances where a need for uniformity 
precludes the recognition of exceptions to generally 
applicable laws under RFRA, it would be surprising to find 
that this was such a case, given the longstanding peyote 
exemption and the fact that the very reason Congress 
enacted RFRA was to respond to a decision denying a 
claimed right to sacramental use of a controlled substance.53 
The Court also pointed out that RFRA itself already “plainly 
contemplates” a mechanism for determining exceptions to RFRA.54 
In response to the government’s slippery-slope concerns, the Court 
explained, “RFRA operates by mandating consideration, under the 
compelling interest test, of exceptions to ‘rule[s] of general 
applicability.’”55 
Finally, the Court countered the government’s concerns about 
eviscerating Congress’s purposes for passing the Controlled 
Substances Act by outlining Congress’s reasons for enacting 
RFRA.56 It elaborated, “Congress recognized that ‘laws “neutral” 
toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws 
intended to interfere with religious exercise,’ and legislated ‘the 
compelling interest test’ as the means for the courts to ‘strik[e] 
sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior 
governmental interests.’”57 
III. STATEMENT OF EXISTING LAW
The historical context of free exercise rights is only part of the 
story. It is also important to see where Hobby Lobby fits within the 
context of recent healthcare law changes. 
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 434.
55. Id. at 436.
56. Id. at 439.
57. Id.
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A. ACA
In 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA).58 The ACA is a very expansive law, and it changed 
a great many aspects of the healthcare system.59 Among the many 
changes effected by the ACA is the following preventative services 
provision: 
A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering 
group or individual health insurance coverage shall, at a 
minimum provide coverage for and shall not impose any 
cost sharing requirements for . . . (4) with respect to 
women, such additional preventive care and screenings . . . 
as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by 
the Health Resources and Services Administration for 
purposes of this paragraph.60 
The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) is 
an agency subset of the United States Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS).61 The HRSA sought the Institute of 
Medicine’s (IOM) recommendations for its guidelines.62 The IOM’s 
report recommended that insurance plans cover “[a]ll Food and Drug 
Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization 
procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women with 
reproductive capacity.”63 The FDA-approved contraceptive methods 
include diaphragms, oral contraceptive pills, intrauterine devices, and 
emergency contraceptives such as Plan B and ulipristal, commonly 
known as the morning-after pill and the week-after pill, 
respectively.64 
On August 1, 2011, HRSA adopted IOM’s recommendations.65 
On February 15, 2012, HHS published its rules finalizing the HRSA 
58. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
The law was amended a week later. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. 
L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
59. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1283 (W.D. Okla. 2012).
60. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a) (2010).
61. Id. at 1283, n.1.
62. Id. at 1283.
63. Id. at 1283–84 (quoting Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited Feb. 20, 
2016)). 
64. Id. at 1284 (citing another source).
65. Id. (citing 76 Fed. Reg. 46621; 45 C.F.R. § 147.130).
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guidelines.66 The guidelines stated that “[u]nless grandfathered or 
otherwise exempt, employers’ group health plans must provide 
coverage conforming with the guidelines for plan years beginning on 
or after August 1, 2012.”67 Some “religious employers” are exempt, 
as are employers with fewer than fifty employees.68 Any non-exempt 
employer that fails to comply with the mandate must pay a fine of 
$100 per day per affected individual.69 The fine for failing to provide 
health insurance altogether is $2,000 per year per full-time 
employee.70 
B. Hobby Lobby
The Greens own the Hobby Lobby craft store franchise, as well 
as the Mardel Christian bookstore franchise.71 The Hahns own 
Conestoga Wood Specialties, a closely-held for-profit corporation.72 
The Greens and Hahns brought suit against Kathleen Sebelius, 
Secretary of the HHS, challenging the validity of the HHS 
contraceptive mandate under RFRA and the First Amendment’s Free 
Exercise Clause.73 Specifically, the Greens contended that while their 
religious beliefs obligate them to provide health insurance to their 
employees, these beliefs prohibit them from providing abortion-
causing drugs and devices.74 In fact, Hobby Lobby’s insurance plans 
have long explicitly excluded “contraceptive devices that might 
cause abortions and pregnancy-termination drugs like RU-486.”75 
Hobby Lobby argued that it was faced with “an unconscionable 
choice: either violate the law, or violate their faith.”76 Both families 
specifically object to four methods of contraception that operate after 
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 41726, 41729).
68. Id. To qualify as a “religious employer,” the main purpose of the organization must be to
teach religious values, the organization must primarily employ persons who share the 
organization’s religious tenets, the organization must primarily serve persons who share the 
organization’s religious tenets, and the organization must be a nonprofit organization under 
§§ 6033(a)(1), 6033(a)(3)(A)(i), or 6033(a)(3)(A)(iii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended.  Id.
69. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2765.
72. Id. at 2764.
73. Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1283.
74. Id. at 1285.
75. Id.
76. Id. (quoting Complaint ¶ 133).
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the fertilization of an egg.77 They believe these four methods are 
abortifacients, and to offer these methods as part of their health 
insurance plan would be tantamount to facilitating abortions, to 
which the families object on religious grounds.78 
The Supreme Court sided with the petitioners, holding that: 
(1) closely-held for-profit corporations, such as Hobby Lobby, fall
within the scope of “persons” to whom RFRA applies, and (2) the
HHS contraceptive mandate, as applied to Hobby Lobby and others
similarly situated, fails the strict scrutiny that RFRA requires.79
C. Corporations Are People
In reaching its determination that corporations qualify as 
“people” within the meaning of RFRA, the Court first evaluated the 
text of the law itself. Because RFRA does not define the term 
“person,” the Court consulted the Dictionary Act.80 Pursuant to the 
Dictionary Act, “the wor[d] ‘person’ . . . include[s] corporations, 
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint 
stock companies, as well as individuals.”81 There is nothing in RFRA 
that signals Congressional intent to deviate from the Dictionary Act’s 
definition of “person” to exclude corporations such as Hobby 
Lobby.82 
Next, the Supreme Court noted that it has previously entertained 
both RFRA and free-exercise claims brought by nonprofit 
corporations.83 Plus, HHS conceded that a nonprofit corporation can 
be a “person” under RFRA.84 Because there is no authority for 
interpreting the term “person” to include some, but not all 
corporations, within the context of a single statute, and because 
nonprofit corporations appear to qualify as people under RFRA, 
closely-held for-profit corporations such as Hobby Lobby must also 
qualify.85 The decision does not, however, impact publicly traded 
companies with a large number of unrelated shareholders, because it 
77. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762–63.
78. Id. at 2759.
79. Id. at 2755.
80. Id. at 2768.
81. Id. (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2768–69.
84. Id. at 2769.
85. Id.
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is difficult (if not impossible) to ascertain the sincere religious beliefs 
of such corporations.86 But because no such company brought a 
RFRA claim in this case, the Court did not decide whether RFRA 
applies to such publicly-traded companies.87 
The Court also noted the sweeping breadth of RFRA itself as 
evidence that Congress did not intend to exclude corporations.88 It 
stressed this point by emphasizing that Congress went “far beyond” 
what is constitutionally required.89 Congress, the Court explained, 
designed RFRA to provide “very broad protection for religious 
liberty.”90 But according to Justice Ginsburg, “RFRA’s purpose was 
‘only to overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith,’ not to 
‘unsettle other areas of the law.’”91 
However, in context, it is clear that Congress’s concern about 
“unsettl[ing] other areas of law” primarily involved inadvertently 
burdening religious organizations in other ways.92 It was not, as 
Ginsburg contends, an attempt to proactively limit the scope of 
RFRA to avoid unsettling other areas of law in general.93 
Specifically, Congress mentioned that rights granted to religious 
organizations under the Establishment Clause shall remain in effect, 
that religious accommodations under Title VII shall be unchanged, 
and that “granting” rights should not be construed as “denying” 
rights.94 Although it also specified that religious organizations 
distributing literature are still subject to generally applicable time, 
place, and manner restrictions to their free speech, the bulk of 
Congress’s focus seemed to involve not incidentally burdening a 
religious organization’s other established rights.95 
From a policy perspective, the Supreme Court has, in recent 
years, also shown its concern for protecting entities and corporations 
by expanding constitutionally-protected individual rights to cover 
them. In 2010, in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,96 
86. Id. at 2774.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 2767–68.
89. Id. at 2767.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2791 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 12 (1993)).
92. S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 12–13 (1993).
93. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2791 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
94. S. REP. NO. 103-111 at 13–15 (1993).
95. Id. at 13.
96. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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the Court held that “the Government may not suppress political 
speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity” and that 
restricting corporate expenditures for electioneering communications 
violated those First Amendment free speech rights.97 Then, in 2012, 
the Court reinforced these protections by holding that a Montana 
statute banning corporate expenditures, which support or oppose a 
candidate or political party, violated the corporation’s free speech 
rights.98 Though this idea is still a point of contention for many,99 it 
is consistent with recent precedent. Therefore, it is unsurprising that 
the Court held in this case that privately-held corporations are 
“people” for the purposes of RFRA’s protections. 
True to form, the Supreme Court also expressed concern about 
disincentivizing businesses from incorporating in the Hobby Lobby 
opinion. It explained, “we reject HHS’s argument that the owners of 
the companies forfeited all RFRA protection when they decided to 
organize their businesses as corporations rather than sole 
proprietorships or general partnerships.”100 Supporting its conclusion 
that corporations qualify as “people” within the meaning of the 
statute, the Court explained, “A corporation is simply a form of 
organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends.”101 The 
Court elaborated that extending constitutional or statutory rights to 
corporations effectively protects the rights of the people involved 
with the corporation, including shareholders, officers, and 
employees.102 While HHS and the dissent argued that RFRA should 
not apply to corporations because corporations cannot exercise 
religion, the Court explained that, “allowing Hobby Lobby, 
Conestoga, and Mardel to assert RFRA claims protects the religious 
liberty of the Greens and the Hahns.”103 
Justice Ginsburg pointed out, however, that a person doing 
business as a sole proprietorship, for example, is incentivized to 
incorporate to separate him- or herself from the entity in order to 
97. Id. at 365 (explaining that “[s]ection 441b’s restrictions on corporate independent
expenditures are therefore invalid and cannot be applied to Hillary”). 
98. Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012).
99. See Adam Winkler, Corporations Are People, and They Have More Rights Than You,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 30, 2014, 5:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-winkler 
/corporations-are-people-a_b_5543833.html. 
100. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
101. Id. at 2768.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2769.
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escape personal liability for the entity’s obligations.104 It seems 
unfair, she explained, for this person to effectively be a corporation 
when it is convenient to escape liability, but then to also be a person 
when that is convenient to help the company dodge federal 
regulatory legislation.105 However, this apparent injustice was 
statutorily created, and could therefore be statutorily remedied. 
Perhaps Justice Ginsburg’s problem isn’t with the Court’s 
interpretation of RFRA, but rather with RFRA itself. 
D. Strict Scrutiny
RFRA essentially imposes a form of strict scrutiny on federal 
laws and regulations which substantially burden the exercise of 
religion, requiring that the government establish that its law: “(1) is 
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the 
least restrictive means of furthering that interest.”106 
E. Substantial Burden
HHS argued the contraceptive mandate does not impose 
a substantial burden because the connection between providing 
health-insurance coverage and destruction of an embryo is too 
attenuated.107 As HHS explained, an embryo would only be 
destroyed if an employee chose to use one of the four contraception 
methods at issue.108 The Court rejected this argument on two 
grounds: (1) this argument does not address the issue of whether the 
mandate imposes a substantial burden on the objecting parties’ 
ability to conduct business in accordance with their religious beliefs; 
and (2) this argument really addresses whether the religious belief 
asserted is reasonable, a question the federal courts “have no 
business addressing.”109 It continued, “[I]t is not for us to say that 
their religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial. Instead, our 
‘narrow function . . . in this context is to determine’ whether the line 
drawn reflects ‘an honest conviction.’”110 The Greens and Hahns 
104. Id. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2779 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012)).
107. Id. at 2777.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2778.
110. Id. at 2779 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707,
716 (1981)). 
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believe that the four contested contraception methods are tantamount 
to abortion; the parties do not dispute that this represents an honest 
conviction.111 
This argument is tautological, though. Finding an honest 
conviction only establishes that the Greens’ and Hahns’ religious 
practice is burdened.112 The Court does not seem to acknowledge a 
mechanism by which it can determine whether that burden is 
substantial.113 If petitioners have honest beliefs, the law is 
necessarily a substantial burden; if the government tries to establish 
that the burden is insubstantial, it necessarily engages in a forbidden 
analysis of the religion’s merits. This essentially elevates every 
incidental burden on an honestly-held religious conviction to the 
level of “substantial burden,” and forbids any discussion to the 
contrary. 
To further justify its holding that the mandate imposes a 
substantial burden, the Court characterized the fine for failure to 
comply with the HHS contraceptive mandate as economically 
“severe.”114 Aggregating the total cost of the fines over the course of 
a year, the Court found that continuing to offer group health plans 
that exclude the contraceptives at issue would result in fines of $457 
million for Hobby Lobby, $33 million for Conestoga, and $15 
million for Mardel.115 Dropping health insurance coverage altogether 
would result in fines of $26 million for Hobby Lobby, $1.8 million 
for Conestoga, and $800,000 for Mardel.116 
It is unclear from the opinion what these companies earn in 
profit each year, or what percentage of the businesses these sums 
represent. According to Forbes, Hobby Lobby earned roughly $3.3 
billion in revenue from January through October 2014.117 Assuming 
Hobby Lobby didn’t earn another dollar in 2014, this would still 
make the $26 million fine for dropping employee coverage less than 
0.79% of Hobby Lobby’s annual revenue. 
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2775.
115. Id. at 2775–76.
116. Id. at 2776.
117. America’s Largest Private Companies, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/companies
/hobby-lobby-stores/ (last updated Oct. 2014). 
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An amicus brief in support of HHS further argued that the 
$2,000 per employee penalty for failing to provide health insurance 
was actually less than the cost of providing insurance, and therefore 
eliminated any substantial burden.118 But the Court rejected this 
argument as well.119 First, the Court noted that this argument was not 
raised below and was not raised by any party.120 Next, the Court 
pointed out that this argument ignores the fact that the Greens’ and 
Hahns’ religious beliefs require them to provide health insurance for 
their employees.121 Because their beliefs require both that they 
provide health insurance for their employees and that they not 
facilitate post-fertilization contraception methods, the substantial 
burden could not be mitigated.122 
Finally, the Court explained that simply comparing the raw cost 
of the $2,000 penalty for dropping coverage altogether with the raw 
cost of providing health insurance coverage omits other costs.123 
Namely, it ignores the cost to the company of becoming a less 
competitive employer for failing to offer health insurance.124 
Furthermore, the Court doubted that either the Congress that enacted 
RFRA or the Congress that enacted the ACA would have found it 
reasonable to force a business to decide between violating its 
sincerely held religious beliefs and making all of its employees lose 
their healthcare plans.125 
Presumably, though, the Congress that enacted the ACA 
anticipated that many employers would have to choose between 
providing plans that comply with the new standards and dropping 
coverage altogether, since that is what the law mandates.126 And 
though the Congress that passed RFRA intended the scope to be 
sweeping,127 it is unclear whether it intended to make all incidental 
burdens on honestly-held religious beliefs necessarily 
“substantial.”128 




122. Id. at 2777.
123. Id. at 2776–77.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2777.
126. Id. at 2762.
127. Id. at 2767.
128. See id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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F. Compelling Governmental Interest
RFRA requires the government to demonstrate a compelling 
governmental interest in applying the challenged law specifically “to 
the person.”129 The Court rejected most of HHS’s purported 
compelling governmental interests, such as “promoting public 
health” and “gender equality” as being too broadly-framed to qualify 
under RFRA.130 However, HHS also asserted that it has a compelling 
interest in ensuring all women have access to contraception without 
cost sharing.131 The Court assumed arguendo that this was 
sufficiently compelling, notwithstanding the numerous exceptions to 
the mandate (including the grandfathered plans exception).132 
G. Least Restrictive Means
Once the government establishes a compelling interest, it must 
also establish that the law, as applied to the people claiming a 
substantial burden, is the least restrictive means for furthering that 
interest.133 Here, the Court explains that the government did not 
demonstrate that it lacks other, less restrictive means of achieving its 
asserted goal of providing all women access to contraception without 
cost sharing.134 One such alternative, it opines, would be for the 
government to pay for the four contraceptives at issue to any woman 
unable to obtain it due to her employers’ religious objections.135 
HHS has not demonstrated that this alternative is unviable.136 The 
Court explained further that the cost of providing the four 
contraceptives at issue would likely be minor in light of the overall 
cost of the ACA.137 Finally, RLUIPA requires the government to 
sometimes incur expenses “to avoid imposing a substantial burden 
on religious exercise.”138 
129. Id. at 2779 (quoting Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546
U.S. 418, 430–31 (2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2014)). 
130. Id. (quoting Brief for HHS in No. 13-354, at 46, 49).
131. Id.





137. Id. at 2781.
138. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(c) (2014)).
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In fact, there is already a system in place for the government to 
cover the cost of religious exemptions such as these.139 When a 
nonprofit organization with a religious objection self-certifies that it 
opposes providing coverage for contraceptive services, the insurance 
issuer or third-party administrator must exclude such coverage from 
the group health plan and pay separately to cover the services.140 The 
insurance issuer or third-party administrator may not pass these costs 
down to the organization, the group health plan, or the patients.141 
The Court suggested that the government could presumably just 
extend this mechanism to also accommodate closely-held for-profit 
companies with religious objections, such as Hobby Lobby and 
Conestoga Wood Specialties.142 It noted this is actually a more 
effective means of accomplishing its stated goal than if these 
organizations dropped insurance coverage altogether and forced their 
employees to pay for individual plans in order to receive these free 
services.143 
However, it is entirely possible this alternative is untenable in 
practice. Hobby Lobby alone employs 23,000 people.144 Obviously 
not every Hobby Lobby employee is female, but female dependents 
of male (and female) workers are also affected.145 And of course, the 
decision is not limited to the petitioners in this suit. According to a 
2000 study, 52% of Americans work for a “closely-held” 
corporation.146 
And it is possible, if not likely, that at least some of these other 
closely-held corporations may object on religious grounds to aspects 
other than the four contraceptives at issue in Hobby Lobby. These 
closely-held corporations could, in theory, object on religious 




143. Id. at 2783.
144. America’s Largest Private Companies, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/companies
/hobby-lobby-stores/ (last updated Oct. 2014). 
145. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). 
146. Aaron Blake, A Lot of People Could Be Affected by the Supreme Court’s Birth Control
Decision—Theoretically, WASH. POST: THE FIX (June 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost 
.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/06/30/a-lot-of-people-could-be-affected-by-the-supreme-courts-birth 
-control-decision/; see also Schulyer Velasco, Hobby Lobby Decision: Eight Important Numbers
to Know, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 1, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/2014
/0701/Hobby-Lobby-decision-Eight-important-numbers-to-know/90-percent.
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grounds to any number of provisions in any number of laws. 
Requiring the government to assume the cost of every mandate every 
closely-held corporation objects to quickly snowballs past the point 
of economic feasibility. 
The Court then distinguished the contraceptive mandate from 
services like immunizations by explaining that the government’s 
interest in preventing the spread of communicable diseases is 
fundamentally different from its interest in ensuring all women have 
access to contraception without cost sharing.147 It noted in particular 
that the “least restrictive means” of providing the respective services 
would be different.148 But the HHS listed “promoting public health” 
among its compelling interests for issuing the contraceptive 
mandate.149 This is presumably the same interest furthered by 
immunization services. 
It is also unclear how requiring the government to absorb the 
cost of providing contraception services is fundamentally different 
from requiring the government to absorb the cost of providing 
immunizations. Though the spread of communicable diseases might 
seem to be a more compelling interest, which affects more people 
more severely, the least restrictive means of accomplishing both 
goals appears to be the same. Furthermore, there is no precedent to 
support the idea that the more compelling a government interest, the 
more it can restrict RFRA rights even when less restrictive 
alternatives are available. 
IV. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE HOBBY LOBBY DECISION
The very same concerns expressed in Smith and Flores are also 
implicated in the Hobby Lobby decision. Namely, RFRA carves out 
an exception from every federal law for contentious religious 
objectors.150 As discussed above in Section III(b)(ii)(1), the Court 
does not address the question of whether the burden on a person’s 
religious beliefs is substantial. Instead, it asks only whether the belief 
is sincerely held.151 Because it is difficult to disprove a person’s 
147. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 2779 (quoting Brief for HHS in No. 13-354, at 46, 49) (citations omitted).
150. Id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 2779.
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subjective belief, and even the smallest potential burdens on religious 
exercise qualify, the potential for abuse is worrisome. 
Hobby Lobby alone employs 23,000 people.152 This decision 
will impact every female employee, as well as every female 
dependent covered under the plans.153 But of course Hobby Lobby, 
Mardel Christian, and Conestoga Wood Specialties aren’t the only 
closely-held corporations affected by this decision. Allowing every 
closely-held corporation to object to federal laws it deems 
inconvenient on the basis of religious objection has the potential to 
cause “havoc.”154 
The Court had other concerns, though. It insisted that allowing 
the government to require all employers to provide coverage for all 
legal medical procedures under RFRA would pave the way for 
mandatory third-trimester abortions and assisted suicide.155 This 
result, it explains, would exclude conscientious religious objectors 
from participating in this nation’s “economic life.”156 
While these extreme hypotheticals certainly reveal the Court’s 
deepest concerns and fears, they do not compellingly justify its 
decision. First, there is a big difference between requiring an 
unwilling patient to undergo an unwanted mandatory third-trimester 
abortion or assisted suicide and requiring an unwilling employer to 
offer a group health insurance plan which covers such procedures in 
jurisdictions where they are already legal. One forcibly violates a 
citizen’s bodily integrity while the other amounts to a tax or fine. 
Secondly, the notion that enforcing such a mandate would cause 
these religious objectors to give up their businesses and opt out of 
American “economic life” is unsupportable. There are doubtlessly 
many state laws of general applicability, which incidentally burden 
religious exercise. Since state laws are not covered under RFRA,157 
and these burdens generally fall short of Free Exercise Clause 
protection,158 corporations are still subject to these burdens. 
152. Americas Largest Private Companies, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/companies
/hobby-lobby-stores/ (last updated Oct. 2014). 
153. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2783.
156. Id.
157. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
158. Emp’t Div., Dep’t. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
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On the other hand, as Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent, 
“[t]he ability of women to participate equally in the economic and 
social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control 
their reproductive lives.”159 The Court does not adequately explain 
why its unsupported fear that corporations will withdraw from 
American economic life trumps the long-established reality that 
women unable to control their reproductive lives are unable to 
participate equally in economic and social life. 
Perhaps the answer lies in considering the Hobby Lobby 
decision’s place in the broader conversation between Congress and 
the Supreme Court on the appropriate level of protection for free 
exercise rights. Since the Smith decision, there has been a virtual 
ping-pong match wherein the Supreme Court issues a decision, 
warning about the dangers inherent in protecting free exercise rights 
too vigorously, followed by a congressional statute, lamenting the 
Supreme Court’s failure to adequately protect these important rights, 
and so forth. 
A notable difference distinguishing Hobby Lobby from Smith 
and Flores is that in Smith and Flores, the Supreme Court cautioned 
against the dangers inherent in providing such broad free exercise 
protections in order to strike down the requested religious 
exemptions. By contrast, the Supreme Court seemingly ignores its 
reasoning in Smith and Flores in order to uphold the religious 
exemption at issue in Hobby Lobby. So far Congress has not heeded 
the Supreme Court’s warnings about the dangers of carving out 
religious exceptions from every general applicable law. It first passed 
RFRA, then bolstered it by passing RLUIPA and the AIRFA 
Amendments. 
If popular opinion originally motivated Congress to bolster 
religious protections, perhaps popular opinion can similarly motivate 
it to change course now. Furthermore, by effectively invalidating one 
of Congress’s own laws (the contraceptive mandate portion of the 
ACA), the Hobby Lobby decision may make the Supreme Court’s 
point finally resonate with Congress in a way that the Supreme 
Court’s previous warnings seemingly haven’t. 
159. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992)). 
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V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The Hobby Lobby decision has been widely criticized by the 
public.160 However, much of the popular backlash against the Hobby 
Lobby decision misses the mark. Many people conflate the First 
Amendment Free Exercise Clause protections with those protections 
granted by RFRA.161 They therefore overestimate both the scope of 
the Hobby Lobby decision and the obstacles standing in the way of a 
solution.162 The result has been a lot of misdirected rage aimed at the 
Supreme Court.163 
But it is important not to lose sight of the issue, especially 
because the solution is very attainable. Hobby Lobby is not actually a 
constitutional decision. It does not dictate that the First Amendment 
permits corporations to ignore the contraceptive mandate portion of 
the ACA. Rather, it instructs that this right is granted by RFRA, a 
Congress-enacted piece of legislation.164 Because Congress enacted 
both the ACA and RFRA, the law can be changed by popular 
opinion. The American public can use its voting power to either put 
pressure on the existing members of Congress, or to change the 
makeup of Congress in order to change the law. It is therefore 
important to redirect public opinion away from the Supreme Court 
and toward Congress to implement change. 
There are three main ways Congress could change the law: 
(1) amend the ACA, such that the provision does not run afoul of
RFRA; (2) amend RFRA, limiting its scope such that the ACA, and
future laws like it, are not affected; or (3) repeal RFRA entirely.
The first option—amending the ACA—would probably be the 
most difficult of the three potential solutions. While it is theoretically 
possible for Congress to amend the ACA in a way that develops a 
scheme to make all health plans cover all recommended forms of 
160. See Staci Zaretsky, Angry Mob Takes to Twitter to Scream at SCOTUSBlog for Hobby
Lobby Decision, ABOVE THE LAW (July 1, 2014, 10:15 AM), http://abovethelaw.com 
/2014/07/angry-mob-takes-to-twitter-to-scream-at-scotusblog-for-hobby-lobby-decision/. 
161. Id.; see also Jamie Fuller, How the Internet Blamed the Wrong Twitter Handle for





164. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014).
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contraception without running afoul of RFRA, the difficulties in 
doing this in practice quickly become apparent. 
First, it assumes that this is even possible in practice. It is likely 
that closely-held corporations, such as Hobby Lobby, will feel that 
any employee receiving such a benefit as a result of her employment 
with or connection to Hobby Lobby is tantamount to facilitating 
abortions, even if the government, for example, paid the portion of 
plan premiums that covered these services and required the insurance 
company to keep the money in two separate funds.165 Presumably at 
some point, the corporation’s claims might become too attenuated to 
establish a “substantial burden,” but it is extremely unclear from the 
decision when, if ever, that occurs. 
Nonetheless, supposing arguendo that it were possible either to 
get Hobby Lobby to agree to a scheme, or for the burden imposed by 
such a scheme to dip below the critical “substantial” threshold line, 
that has resolved the issue for only one corporation. Other 
corporations may view the scheme as substantially burdening their 
free exercise of religion in other ways or for other reasons. And 
because the standard is what the corporation subjectively believes, in 
theory, two members of the same religion—perhaps even the same 
church—could potentially view different aspects of the law as 
unduly burdensome. 
To avoid this, Congress could completely overhaul the ACA to 
cut out the corporate middleman and simply have the government 
provide or subsidize group health insurance for employees of all 
religious organizations and closely-held corporations. This, however, 
would require a major overhaul of the law as well as the mechanisms 
currently in place to provide these employees with health insurance. 
Flooding the medical exchanges with all these extra employees, for 
example, could very easily cause problems for the whole system, if 
not carefully planned for and managed. Indeed, there appears to be a 
more elegant solution. 
165. This was the rationale behind several employers’ objections to filling out a form
informing the government that they objected on religious grounds to the contraceptive mandate. 
See Reply Brief of Appellants at 5, Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 134 
S. Ct. 1022 (2014) (No. 13-1540), 2014 WL 1653856, at *11. Docket available at http://www.sup
remecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/13a691.htm. Lower court’s decision available
at http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/2014.12.27-Order-denying-PI.pdf.
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Alternatively, instead of attempting to craft an ACA amendment 
that complies with RFRA, Congress could amend the ACA to apply, 
notwithstanding RFRA, effectively carving out an exemption from 
RFRA for the ACA. Ultimately, however, simply amending the ACA 
doesn’t really fix the bigger problem. While it would effectively 
overturn the Hobby Lobby decision as it applies to the contraceptive 
mandate, it is not the best solution for fundamentally fixing the 
potential problems RFRA can cause. Such a scheme would require 
Congress to manually fix every law it fears RFRA will undermine. 
But RFRA threatens to undermine essentially every federal law. A 
piecemeal approach of effectively carving out an exception to an 
exception in order to make every federal law whole again is therefore 
not the best way to fix all of RFRA’s potential pitfalls. 
The second two options—either amending or repealing RFRA—
seem fraught with far fewer problems and do not require radically 
changing the current state of religious accommodation. 
First, Congress could amend RFRA. Just as easily as it expanded 
the scope of RFRA’s protections by passing RLUIPA, it can pass 
another law limiting the scope back down. The biggest challenge 
here would probably be getting Congress to agree where to draw the 
line. If the constitutional protections, which leave in place laws of 
general applicability which incidentally burden religious exercise, 
are insufficient, what is sufficient, and why? How does Congress 
adequately balance the rights of people (and closely-held 
corporations) to freely exercise their chosen religion with the need 
for the nation’s federal laws to have teeth? It is a difficult question 
for a single person to answer, much less a majority of the two houses 
of Congress. 
Perhaps, then, a more elegant solution would be for Congress to 
repeal RFRA altogether. After all, this was done with respect to state 
laws in Flores, and business does not appear to have come to a 
screeching halt as a result. While this appears at first glance to 
provide less protection for religious liberties, any unjust result can be 
mitigated. Just as several states (including, eventually, Oregon) 
exempted sacramental peyote use from its drug laws, so too could 
Congress amend its own laws to mitigate any unjust result. 
Although it is, in general, not always easy to get Congress to 
agree to pass a law, presumably if the burden is significantly unjust, 
Congress can band together, as it did when originally passing RFRA 
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and RLUIPA, to create specific exceptions to specific laws. This is 
preferable to a blanket exception to all federal laws. Under RFRA, in 
its current state, when Congress finally does come together to pass 
sweeping legislation like the ACA, the law is poked so full of 
exemption holes that its full force and effect crumble. This is 
precisely the danger the Supreme Court warned of in the Smith 
decision. 
Of course no solution is perfect. The primary concern with 
leaving the decision to the legislative process about which religious 
liberties should be proactively protected is that minority religions 
may not get the same protections as more popular religions. This 
concern is definitely valid—whenever protections are essentially left 
to the majority to enforce, minorities are often unprotected. 
However, safeguards already exist within the existing 
constitutional framework to protect minority religions. Because these 
must be laws of general applicability, the majority is still unable to 
specifically target an unpopular religion with a burdensome law. 
Furthermore, the passage of RFRA following the Smith case 
shows that the majority can and does stand up to correct unjust 
results when a new law of general applicability burdens long-
established religious practice. Of course the system may not be 
perfect, and religions that are more stigmatized may not get the same 
benefit of legislative protection that a more popularly-supported 
religion gets. But under the current system, a person can simply 
create a new religion to avoid complying with any federal laws they 
don’t like. No system is perfect, and falling back on the 
constitutional protections, while relying on Congress to mitigate 
unjust results, is preferable to the alternatives. 
VI. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE PROPOSAL
Congress changing the law eloquently solves the two main 
problems. In the smaller sense, the concern that corporations get to 
trounce all over their female employees’ (and dependents’) 
reproductive rights will be resolved. Closely-held corporations will 
be required to comply with all generally-applicable federal laws that 
incidentally burden their religious practice just as they are already 
required to comply with all such state laws. No longer will the 
women covered under these companies’ plans or the federal 
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government have to worry about coming up with alternative options 
for meeting the individuals’ healthcare needs. 
In the broader sense, Congress no longer has to worry about 
essentially undermining every federal law it passes. Laws that 
Congress deemed important enough to pass in the first place will 
regain their “teeth,” and the policies underlying these laws will again 
thrive without being potentially undermined by a critical mass of 
exemptions. 
Furthermore, urging Congress to fix the injustices created by its 
law is the most productive use of public outrage. It is, 
quintessentially, why the public has the right to vote and change the 
makeup of Congress. And because the Hobby Lobby decision deals 
only with the protections afforded under RFRA, as opposed to the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, there are no 
constitutional implications. 
Amending the law also assuages the Supreme Court’s 
ever-present concerns about overstepping its boundaries on issues 
that can be adequately resolved through the popular vote and 
political process. But Congress’s utilization of the political process to 
implement RFRA in direct response to an unjust result for the 
employees in Smith was overkill. Simply put, as explained in Smith, 
these rights can be adequately protected by the political process, and 
do not require blanket protection at the expense of all generally-
applicable laws.166 
VII. CONCLUSION
Since 1990 when the Supreme Court issued its decision in 
Smith, Congress and the Supreme Court have engaged in a lengthy 
back-and-forth political struggle over the appropriate level of First 
Amendment free exercise protection. In Smith, the Court saw past the 
unfortunate consequences that would inevitably befall the 
sympathetic defendants in front of it to establish the general principle 
that keeping laws of general applicability in full force and effect is 
more important than protecting the rights of the people to exercise 
their chosen religion freely and without burden. Outraged by the 
unjust result that befell these particular defendants, Congress acted 
swiftly to reverse the Supreme Court’s ruling to the full extent 
166. Emp’t Div., Dep’t. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
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possible. But perhaps it acted too quickly, and without its eye on the 
bigger picture. 
The Supreme Court, outraged itself that Congress would attempt 
to overturn one of the Court’s rulings so quickly and so substantially, 
reemphasized the drastic and sweeping impacts a law like RFRA 
would have, and invalidated RFRA as applied to the states for being 
too out of proportion to any perceived remedial objective. 
And back and forth it went over the years until Hobby Lobby, 
where the Supreme Court appeared to reverse course, finally 
upholding an asserted religious exemption under RFRA. Although 
the Court expressed that its reasons for doing so were a concern for 
protecting the rights of people who incorporate, it is probably no 
coincidence that it chose to uphold the exemption when applied to a 
law Congress itself had passed. 
Although this battle might have been about the First 
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause when it began, by the time it has 
reached Hobby Lobby, the Constitution is no longer part of the 
dialogue. RFRA is responsible for this result. And because the 
problem is statutory, as opposed to constitutional, it is much easier to 
fix. Because the Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby is all 
about the proper way to interpret RFRA (as opposed to the 
Constitution), changing (or ideally, repealing) RFRA eliminates the 
need for this interpretation, and as a result, the problems that arise 
from it. 
